Suchergebnisse

Over the last forty years the world has witnessed the emergence and proliferation of a new political phenomenon - unarmed revolution. This book explores why some nonviolent revolutionary movements lead to unarmed revolution, and others result in devastating failure

The Yugoslav transition(s) to democracy is perhaps the most complex of all the Eastern European cases. It can be argued that Yugoslavia enjoyed the most favorable initial conditions of any country in the region: the regime was relatively liberal, there was an indigenous, vibrant civil society, an economic crisis had put politicians on the defensive, and the country was not overly tied to either Western or Eastern influence. Had these structural conditions been the full story, Yugoslavia might have been able to dissolve without the most violent war Europe has experienced since 1945. However, one major factor came to trump all others: nationalism. The history of Yugoslavia's fall cannot be told without attention to ethnic rivalries. Since the country was a federation consisting of six republics and two autonomous provinces imposed on its citizens by the communists that came to power after World War II, only communism could hold the federation together. Once that (discredited) ideological glue was removed, Yugoslavia collapsed on itself. ; The research project 'Mobilizing for Democracy: Democratization Processes and the Mobilization of Civil Society' is funded by European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant. (Grant Agreeement no: 269136.)

In the late 1980s Czechoslovakia was considered one of the most repressive countries in Eastern Europe and a staunch Soviet ally. In the aftermath of the 'Prague Spring' of 1968, repressed with Soviet help, the regime managed to remove virtually all expressions of dissent. Yet in the fall of 1989 civil society forces inspired a popular uprising that put an end to Czechoslovakian authoritarianism and ushered in the transition to democracy. How could a 'Velvet Revolution' from below take place in such a repressive context? What role did civil society actors play in the transition? And what structural and international factors help us solve this puzzle? These are some of the questions this working paper seeks to answer. ; The research project 'Mobilizing for Democracy: Democratization Processes and the Mobilization of Civil Society' is funded by European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant. (Grant Agreeement no: 269136.)

Among cases of transition to democracy from below, the East German one constitutes a particularly challenging puzzle. Whereas social movements taking advantage of an oppositional space within a repressive context have preceded many transitions, the East German case shows little evidence of such large-scale prior opposition. Even when compared to other Eastern European transitions, East Germany is unique in that no major opposition group existed prior to the revolution. Still, civil society groups did play important roles in East Germany in the 1980s. Despite being unable to challenge the regime, they began to create the political space necessary for a protest culture to emerge. In fact, the development of civil society groups assumed an almost evolutionary character as religious groups gave way for peace and environmental movements that eventually transformed in turn into democratization initiatives. This report seeks to highlight some of the most important civil society tendencies present in the GDR and to situate them in the domestic and international contexts that made a mass-based push for democratization possible in the fall of 1989. Furthermore, the report argues that the relative lack of coherent civil society organizations makes the East German transition to democracy a pure example of democratization from below, as opposition elites had little impact on the progression of the revolution. ; The research project 'Mobilizing for Democracy: Democratization Processes and the Mobilization of Civil Society' is funded by European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant. (Grant Agreeement no: 269136.)

Among the Eastern European democratization processes of the 1989 period, Hungary stands out as the least dramatic transition in the region. Whereas other countries experienced massive demonstrations in favor of democratic demands, or violent upheavals resulting in the execution of dictators, Hungary experienced neither and has been referred to as an 'uncomplicated' case. While some mobilization from below did occur, the Hungarian transition was characterized by elites - new and old – and the intentional exclusion of the population at large. Why did the democratization process unfold this way, and why did a seemingly stable regime give up without a fight? These are some of the questions this report seeks to answer. ; The research project 'Mobilizing for Democracy: Democratization Processes and the Mobilization of Civil Society' is funded by European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant. (Grant Agreeement no: 269136.)

Are revolutions made or do they come? This question is at the heart of revolution theory and has received plentiful attention from scholars. In this paper I suggest that adherence to this traditional dichotomy may not be the most useful to approach the study of revolutions. Therefore, I argue that theorists of revolutions are well advised to examine the role of the strategic decisions made by revolutionaries in their struggles against the state. Drawing empirically on the nonviolent revolution of Iran in 1977-79, I show that the strategic decisions made by the opposition movement not only allowed them to capitalize on a political opportunity, but that their strategic choices in fact helped bring that opportunity about in the first place.

AbstractA recent exchange between Allinson (2019) and Abrams (2019) on the current state of revolution theory rests on the assumption that the generational, backward‐looking view of revolution studies is also a fruitful way of thinking of the field's present and future. We argue, in contrast, that while a generational approach has important benefits, it also contains shortcomings that may lead the future of revolution studies in less fruitful directions. We examine where an overreliance on generational thinking has led us, provide an exploratory sketch of how we can begin to move beyond generational thinking, and imagine a new future for the study of revolution.